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unwilling to extinguish the many fires that 
are currently raging across the Arab world.
About the Author
Madawi Al-Rasheed is Visiting Professor 
at the LSE Middle East Centre. In Janu-
ary 2017, she returned to the MEC from 
a sabbatical year at the Middle East Insti-
tute, National University of  Singapore. 
Previously, she was Research Fellow at the 
Open Society Foundation. Between 1994–
2013, she was Professor of  Anthropology 
of  Religion at King’s College London. She 
was also Prize Research Fellow at Nuff-
ield College, Oxford. She has taught at 
Goldsmith College, University of  London 
and the Institute of  Social and Cultural 
Anthropology, University of  Oxford.
Madawi Al-Rasheed 5 
Introduction
With the appointment of  Muhammad ibn Salman as crown prince in June 2017, Saudi 
foreign policy has become the subject of  fevered speculation. Although at the time of 
writing King Salman is still in office, we can assume that his son Muhammad had been 
the de facto orchestrator of  Saudi foreign policy even before he was confirmed in his new 
role. In terms of  relations with the US, Muhammad ibn Salman succeeded in establish-
ing a momentary strong rapport with President Donald Trump and his administration, 
thanks to serious investment in public relations companies, lobbyists in Washington and 
the promise to inject funds in the US economy. Relations with Europe look to have cooled, 
with European leaders still unsure of  how to assess the young prince. Many are never-
theless keen to win him over with the prospect of  financial rewards and stronger military 
ties for their own economic, strategic and security reasons. In the Arab region, the young 
Saudi prince has already cemented new, albeit shaky, partnerships with countries such 
as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in order to further isolate his archenemy, 
Iran, and more recently Qatar. 
This article assesses the prospects for new directions in Saudi foreign policy, highlighting 
its continuities and discontinuities under the new leadership of  King Salman and his son. 
It draws tentative conclusions that amidst a series of  foreign policy failures, winning the 
favour of  the US under Trump has been the major achievement of  the new Saudi leader-
ship. However, Saudi foreign policy in Europe has – as ever – taken a back seat and today 
in several European capitals there is serious doubt as to the merit of  this newly assertive 
and interventionist Saudi regional policy, considered by some to be destabilising the Arab 
world. With the US once again the old Saudi patron and ally, King Salman and his son 
see little need to pay attention to Europe, and are instead continuing on their erratic and 
failing bid to control the region and emerge as a regional power on a par with Iran, Turkey 
and Israel.
Within the Gulf, Saudi policies have fractured the Gulf  Cooperation Council (GCC), with 
two countries – Oman and Qatar – choosing to break ranks with Saudi Arabia over several 
issues, from Iran to the role of  Islamist movements in the Arab world. This latest episode 
in Saudi regional assertiveness will no doubt embarrass its international partners who will 
eventually be expected to choose sides in this new Gulf  conflict, whether or not doing so 
corresponds with their own national interests. The new young prince is swift in rewarding 
allies and punishing those reluctant to support him in each of  his foreign policy stands. 
The paper concludes with the observation that King Salman and his son have proved to 
be risk-takers, unwilling to extinguish the many fires that are currently raging across the 
Arab world. In fact, their foreign policy is based on a single doctrine, namely establishing 
the supremacy of  Saudi Arabia, so as to allow it to become the sole arbiter of  Arab affairs 
and the main point of  entry for all international powers into the region. Saudi Arabia 
under King Salman seems determined to pursue this objective even if  it contributes to 
greater insecurity and upheaval in the Arab world, with serious human, social and politi-
cal consequences beyond this troubled region. 
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Salman’s Coups
On 23 January 2015, the old King Abdullah ibn Abdulaziz Al-Saud (b. 1924) passed 
away. Within hours his half-brother Crown Prince Salman (b. 1935) became king and 
Deputy Crown Prince Muqrin (b. 1945) was promoted to crown prince. Interior Minister 
Muhammad ibn Nayef  (b. 1959) became deputy crown prince. Such arrangements con-
firmed that King Salman was respecting his deceased brother’s succession plan. Before his 
death, King Abdullah had made it clear to other senior princes that the succession should 
remain as he had stipulated and confirmed in his royal orders. Saudis and outside observ-
ers breathed a sigh of  relief  over the swift and smooth transition. Many Saudis considered 
that the succession reflected unity within the royal family. The smooth transfer of  power 
was believed to silence those outside observers and dissidents who had long speculated 
about rivalries among senior royals. 
However, King Salman felt free to alter this succession plan within two months of 
becoming king. In April 2015 he sacked his younger brother Crown Prince Muqrin and 
promoted his nephew, Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad ibn Nayef, to crown prince. He 
went further when he appointed his youngest son Muhammad (b. 1985) to the position of 
deputy crown prince. Young prince Muhammad became second Deputy Prime Minister, 
Minister of  Defence, Chief  of  the Royal Court and Chair of  the Council of  Economic 
Development Affairs. No other prince has ever held as many key positions at such a young 
age as Muhammad ibn Salman.1 Even at the height of  creating a centralised state, King 
Faysal (d. 1975) did not hold so many responsibilities. Since these appointments, Deputy 
Crown Prince Muhammad has been assumed to be the key power behind the throne. 
King Salman is ‘possibly the last member of  the Al Saud who will be able to enjoy the 
unquestioned authority and prestige to impose his will irrespective of  family consensus’.2
On 21 June 2017, King Salman issued an expected royal decree, sacking Crown Prince 
Muhammad ibn Nayef  and promoting his young son Muhammad as the designated heir. 
During the lifespan of  the third Saudi state (1932–), such a move has happened only once 
before, in 1933, when Abdul Aziz ibn Saud appointed his own son Saud as crown prince 
and excluded all his brothers. Salman’s bold decision may not be the last episode in these 
royal shuffles. It remains to be seen whether King Salman will abdicate and allow himself 
to see his beloved son settle into his new role as king. Given the frequency of  royal decrees 
that relate to succession since Salman became king, his abdication would not be a surprise 
given his age – he is over eighty years old. 
1  After the rise of  Muhammad ibn Salman to power, commentators described him as Saudi Arabia’s 
Gamal Mubarak, the son of  deposed Egyptian president Husni Mubarak. See Steven A. Cook, ‘Saudi 
Arabia’s Gamal Mubarak’, Council on Foreign Relations, 20 June 2016. Available at https://www.cfr.org/
blog/saudi-arabias-gamal-mubarak (accessed 11 September 2017).
2  Ali al-Shihabi, The Saudi Kingdom: Between the Jihadi Hammer and the Iranian Anvil (Princeton: Markus 
Wiener Publishers, 2016), p. 158. 
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These bold succession decisions, dubbed by foreign observers a ‘palace coup’ and a ‘quiet 
revolution’, ignited new rumours and speculations about royal intrigue.3 These are further 
strengthened by the fact that Muhammad ibn Nayef, Crown Prince until June 2017, has 
not yet produced a male heir, curtailing the possibility that he could have appointed a 
son of  his own at the expense of  his cousin should he had been allowed to stay in power 
and become king. Furthermore, reports about ibn Nayef ’s poor health had already been 
circulating, especially among foreign intelligence observers in Washington. As the prince 
was totally sidelined in Salman’s bold royal reshuffle, reports abounded that he was being 
held under house arrest in Jeddah immediately after being sacked, though this remains 
unconfirmed.4 
The young prince Muhammad ibn Salman is preparing to inherit the throne, provided 
that no further succession changes take place during the king’s lifetime. But in Saudi 
Arabia nothing can be taken for granted or expected to follow a rational plan. King 
Salman’s new appointments in June 2017 are destined to generate more ambiguity and 
speculation after he dies, especially as concerns Saudi Arabia’s international relations. 
New directions in foreign policy with the US, Europe and the region coincided with the 
promotion of  his own son immediately after Salman became king in 2015.
Muhammad ibn Salman and Trump: A Successful Momen-
tary Symbiosis 
Muhammad ibn Salman visited the US several times with a view to making himself  known 
in Washington5 and promoting himself  at the expense of  his cousin Muhammad ibn 
Nayef, who had already maintained close contacts with the US intelligence and defence 
community as a result of  his involvement in War on Terror efforts since 9/11.6 Imme-
diately after Donald Trump’s election, the young prince rushed to court him, promising 
greater Saudi investment in the US economy and more weapon purchases, both pledges 
welcomed by Trump. During his election campaign, the latter frequently declared that the 
US would not continue to support its traditional partners in Europe, Asia and the Middle 
East without all of  them committing greater financial resources to cement the military 
3  David Blair, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Quiet Revolution as King Salman Changes Royal Succession’, The 
Telegraph, 29 April 2015. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/sau-
diarabia/11571482/Saudi-Arabias-quiet-revolution-as-King-Salman-changes-royal-succession.html 
(accessed 6 July 2016).
4  Ben Hubbard, ‘Deposed Saudi Prince is Said to be under House Arrest’, The New York Times, 28 June 
2017. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/28/world/middleeast/deposed-saudi-prince-
mohammed-bin-nayef.html (accessed 18 July 2017).
5  Simon Henderson, ‘Young Saudi Leader’s Landmark U.S Visit’, The Washington Institute, 13 June 2016. 
Available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/young-saudi-leaders-landmark-
u.s.-visit (accessed 18 June 2017).
6  Julie Hirschfield Davis, ‘Trump Meets Saudi Prince as U.S. and Kingdom Seek Warmer Relations’, 
The New York Times, 14 March 2017. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/world/mid-
dleeast/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-trump.html (accessed 18 June 2017).
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partnerships that the US had helped to forge since World War II. He did not hesitate to 
describe Gulf  countries, including Saudi Arabia, as void of  everything except money. 
Trump’s repeated attempts to ban Muslims from travelling to the US and his anti-Muslim 
rhetoric have not detracted from the new – mutually beneficial – opportunities for close 
cooperation between him and Muhammad ibn Salman. It seemed that both leaders were 
determined to go back to the status quo ante – before the election of  Barack Obama – 
when Saudi Arabia and the US had enjoyed a close and unchallenged partnership. 
A short-lived period of  troubled relations with the US occurred during Barack Obama’s 
presidency. The relationship reached a nadir as Obama declined to indulge Saudi Arabia 
and accede to its constant requests to bomb its archenemy, Iran, or topple Syria’s Bashar 
al-Assad. The Saudis made the first request in 2008 and the second after the outbreak of 
the Syrian uprising in 2011. Saudi Arabia considered the Iran Nuclear Deal that Obama 
and several European leaders signed in 2013 a potent threat, signalling that the US was 
determined to end four decades of  Iranian isolation and diversify its interlocutors in the 
Middle East after having relied on Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, the Gulf  and Israel as its 
main partners in the region. Despite this, under the Obama administration the US sold 
more than $115 billion of  arms to Saudi Arabia.7
While Trump did not fully acquiesce to Saudi requests regarding Iran and Syria, he made 
enough vague noises to endear the Saudi leadership and restore the troubled relations to 
their pre-Obama harmony. Trump’s anti-Iranian rhetoric that he immediately ramped 
up once elected, his repeated threats to reconsider and perhaps abandon the Nuclear 
Deal, his willingness to impose new sanctions on Iran and his description of  Iran as a 
terrorist state pleased the Saudis and paved the way for his historic visit to Riyadh. On 
Syria, immediately after he became President, Trump authorised limited airstrikes that 
barely affected the balance of  power against al-Assad. Nevertheless, such a hasty move 
was positive signal enough for Riyadh to think that Trump was on their side and would 
pursue regime change in Syria. 
On 20 May 2017 Trump arrived in Riyadh accompanied by a large entourage of  family 
advisors, consultants and businessmen. He was welcomed with great fanfare and pomp. 
The Saudis offered him much-needed rehabilitation not only inside Saudi Arabia but 
across the Muslim world. Muhammad ibn Salman assembled over fifty Muslim leaders 
for a Muslim summit and gave the President the opportunity to address them in a historic 
speech.8 This speech was meant to counter Obama’s famous Cairo speech in 2009 when 
he emphasised the US’ commitment to democracy and human rights in the world and its 
respect for Islam as a religion. Obama called on history to show that Islam is an integral 
part of  America by drawing on his mixed parentage, especially his Muslim Kenyan father. 
7  Yara Bayoumy, ‘Obama Administration Arms Sales Offers to Saudi Top $115 Billion’, Reuters, 7 Sep-
tember 2016. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-security-idUSKCN11D2JQ 
(accessed 20 June 2017).
8  For the main points of  Trump’s speech see ‘Donald Trump’s Saudi Arabia Speech: Eight Key Points’, 
The Telegraph, 21 May 2017. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/21/donald-
trumps-saudi-arabia-speech-eight-key-points/ (accessed 18 July 2017).
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In contrast, Trump announced in Riyadh that: 
We signed historic agreements with the Kingdom that will invest almost $400 
billion in our two countries and create many thousands of  jobs in America and 
Saudi Arabia. It should increasingly become one of  the great global centers of 
commerce and opportunity. This region should not be a place from which refu-
gees flee, but to which newcomers flock.9
While Muhammad ibn Salman was pleased that Trump emphasised economic ties, he 
was more eager to hear Trump’s denunciation of  Iran, so he must have been thrilled when 
he heard Trump pointing to Iran’s disruptive role in the region: 
For decades, Iran has fuelled the fires of  sectarian conflict and terror. It is a gov-
ernment that speaks openly of  mass murder, vowing the destruction of  Israel, 
death to America, and ruin for many leaders and nations in this room […] Until 
the Iranian regime is willing to be a partner for peace, all nations of  conscience 
must work together to isolate Iran, deny it funding for terrorism, and pray for 
the day when the Iranian people have the just and righteous government they 
deserve.10  
Saudi Arabia urgently wanted Trump to absolve it from any responsibility for the deadliest 
crisis to have befallen the Arab world, namely terroristic sectarian conflict. There was no 
mention of  how, like Iran, Saudi Arabia resorted to sectarianism as a counter-revolution-
ary force to derail the 2011 Arab uprisings in Bahrain, Syria and most recently in Yemen. 
Its religious ideology, known as Wahhabism, has appeared indistinguishable from that 
adopted by the Islamic State (IS), with the latter incorporating Saudi religious texts into 
the Raqqa school curriculum and enforcing a social and sectarian policy very similar to 
that practised in Saudi Arabia. Sex segregation, anti-Shiʿa rhetoric and beheading point 
to a common ideological affinity between the religious ideology of  IS and Wahhabism. 
Furthermore, Trump refrained from mentioning the role played by Saudi Arabia in 
spreading this radical version of  Islam around the globe. The Saudi role had been crit-
icised since 9/11, but Trump absolved the Kingdom from any responsibility for the 
expansion of  a global jihadi trend that it had initially promoted, together with several 
Western governments, notably during the Reagan and Thatcher years in the 1980s as an 
antidote to Soviet Communism and the occupation of  Afghanistan. The promotion of 
Saudi Wahhabism was a project conceived during the Cold War, during which the coun-
try was elevated to the status of  global player in the Muslim world, but it was specifically 
useful in Afghanistan when it was expected to contribute ideologically, financially and 
personally to the country’s liberation from Soviet occupation. Trump was not interested 
in a deeper understanding of  the roots of  the global jihadi menace, which would impli-
cate both the US and Saudi Arabia in addition to many partners in both the West and 
the Muslim world. Both Muhammad ibn Salman and Donald Trump felt comfortable 
turning the page and sinking into historical amnesia. From now on, the Saudi–US relation 
9   Ibid.
10  Ibid.
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is set to reinstate itself  as a pragmatic marriage of  convenience, void of  any ideological 
underpinnings, such as concerns over human rights, democracy or any other terminology 
that makes Riyadh uncomfortable. Vague incremental social and political reform rather 
than military intervention or promotion of  democracy is Riyadh’s preferred option.
It is important to understand how the two leaders managed to strike an alliance, though 
it may well prove to be momentary, set as it is against a background of  tension and ani-
mosity. Like Muhammad ibn Salman, Trump is unpredictable and the two men may fall 
out over minor differences in the future. However, they will keep the facade of  agreement 
on main issues and maintain a traditional, albeit revived bargain: the Americans shall 
continue to offer unconditional and unequivocal support to Saudi Arabia while the latter 
continues to pay for the privilege of  remaining the main US ally after Israel in the region. 
This bargain had until recently appeared shaky and perhaps lacking in enthusiasm on 
the American side. However, Trump and ibn Salman share a common belief  that ‘money 
talks’, hence their common outlook is based on the assumption that in both business and 
politics only this cherished currency has the potential to solve almost all problems, from 
terrorism to failing economies. Both have no deeper understanding of  the current chal-
lenges of  the Arab world, a disdain for any ‘deep thinking’ and an insatiable appetite for 
public relations companies, lobbyists and the pomp that comes with sudden acquisition 
of  power. So far, the two leaders appear to be in lockstep at least over a number of  key 
issues from Syria to Yemen, but deep down the administration around Trump does not 
seem to share his overt enthusiasm for Saudi regional policies. In Yemen, Syria and Qatar, 
the three hot spots in 2017, both the Pentagon and the US State Department tempered 
Trump’s hasty announcements, thus indicating that contradictions exist within his admin-
istration, parts of  which are prepared to force climb downs from the President, at least 
with regards to brash announcements like those he made when visiting Riyadh, where 
his comments were understood at the time to fully endorse Muhammad ibn Salman’s 
regional wars and interventionist policies. 
While ibn Salman may have won over Trump, he still faces uncertain votes in the House 
of  Representatives and the Senate. In the past, American presidents with clear majorities 
were able to get both houses to approve important arm sales to Saudi Arabia. But since 
9/11, the legislature’s unequivocal support could no longer be taken for granted. 
Having alienated the Saudis when he called them ‘free riders’ in his famous Atlantic inter-
view,11 Obama tried to mend the relationship in his last months in office. In September 
2016, both the House of  Representatives and the Senate overwhelmingly rejected his 
bid to veto the Justice Against Sponsors of  Terrorism Act (JASTA), which allows family 
members of  9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia in American courts.12 This law may prove 
a serious obstacle to US–Saudi relations. 
11  Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic, April 2016. Available at https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ (accessed 25 August 2017).
12  Seung Min Kim, ‘Congress Hands Obama First Veto Override’, The New York Times, 9 September 
2016. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/world/middleeast/trump-weapons-sau-
di-arabia.html?mcubz=0 (accessed 26 August 2017).
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Tension between the American president, this time Donald Trump, and Congress resur-
faced in 2017 over arm sales to Saudi Arabia. Immediately after Trump’s return from 
Riyadh, he narrowly escaped the Senate’s veto on a $500 million deal to sell Saudi Arabia 
precision-guided munitions. With Saudi Arabia’s erratic airstrikes killing many civilians in 
Yemen and the conflict reaching a stalemate almost three years after it started, opposition 
to arms sales will no doubt continue to grow in the US. 
Trump wants to capture a historical moment in which Saudi Arabia is set to transition 
to a bright neoliberal economy open to global trade, accompanied by a minimalist wel-
fare state weaned off  oil. Privatisation, diversification and Saudisation are the backbone 
of  Muhammad ibn Salman’s Vision 2030 – an economic blueprint to deliver economic 
prosperity at times of  falling oil prices and budget deficits. The expansion of  the private 
sector and most importantly the announced partial privatisation of  the Saudi oil company 
ARAMCO offer new economic opportunities that both leaders want to promote and ben-
efit from. Should the national interest of  the US coincide with that of  Muhammad ibn 
Salman, the two leaders hope to closely cooperate in the future. However, both leaders 
can be erratic and capable of  making ad hoc decisions that may backfire.
Salman’s Son and Europe: Secondary Partnerships
Having secured the support, even if  fleeting, of  Donald Trump, does Muhammad ibn 
Salman have the time or inclination to seek further partnerships with European countries 
beyond the historical alliances that have more recently become rooted in trade, arm sales 
and security concerns? 
Since World War II, Saudi relations with leading European countries – namely Britain, 
France and Germany – were secondary to the project of  greater military and security 
integration with the US. Many European countries, especially France and Britain, saw 
a window of  opportunity to seek greater cooperation with the Saudis after 9/11 when 
they assumed the US would be unwilling to continue its unconditional support for the 
Kingdom after it became known that fifteen of  the hijackers who attacked New York were 
Saudis. This proved to be a good moment to endear themselves to the Saudis by selling 
them arms denied to them by the US Congress, and by positioning Europe as the old ally 
who genuinely understood Saudi Arabia, its history and leadership more than the Amer-
ican neophytes. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, sought to diversify its arm sources and 
leapt at the opportunity to buy more weapons from Europe. 
Under the Conservative government of  David Cameron, Britain’s arms sales to Saudi 
Arabia reached almost £6 billion,13 with the country needing to boost its trade with the 
Gulf  in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, immediately after the financial crisis 
13  Matt Broomfield, ‘UK Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia Worth 5.6 billion under David Cameron’, The 
Independent, 6 January 2016. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/uk-has-
sold-56bn-of-military-hardware-to-saudi-arabia-under-david-cameron-research-reveals-a6797861.
html (accessed 12 June 2017).
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of  2008. Under pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the British Prime Minister 
ordered an investigation into the Muslim Brotherhood in Britain with a view to banning 
the Islamist movement and limiting its global outreach. Saudi Arabia, keen to reverse the 
Brotherhood’s success in Egypt after the uprising of  2011, banned the movement in Saudi 
Arabia itself. The investigation, led by ex-ambassador to Saudi Arabia John Jenkins, found 
no clear links to terrorism. The Muslim Brotherhood continues to organise in Britain. It 
took the British government several months to release the information gathered during 
the consultation period, and Saudi Arabia was not pleased with the findings of  the report. 
The drive to seek closer ties with Saudi Arabia became more urgent after the British 
referendum of  2016, when it became certain that the British economy would face the 
possibility of  shrinking after its exit from the European Union. Prime Minister Theresa 
May honoured her pledge to continue to be a friend of  the Saudis and refrained from 
taking any measures or making statements that would embarrass them in the interna-
tional arena. Like other European leaders, she rushed to visit the Saudis as part of  a Gulf 
tour. In April 2017 she arrived in Riyadh (before Trump) and sought to strengthen trade 
relations with Saudi Arabia.  
More recently, May continues to block the publication of  an internal Home Office report 
investigating Saudi sponsorship of  radical religious ideology in Britain. The enquiry was 
commissioned by the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government. It is believed 
that May is still resisting any exposure of  Saudi Arabia to more criticism both in Britain 
and Europe. The release of  the report may undermine relations with Riyadh at a critical 
moment for Britain when it is seeking new trade partners to compensate for its expected 
losses after Brexit. 
Since 2015 when Saudi Arabia began airstrikes on Yemen, Britain came under mounting 
pressure from parliamentary committees and civil society organisations that oppose arm 
sales to countries that do not respect human rights and violate international law through 
illegal military interventions abroad. This became urgent after Muhammad ibn Salman 
launched his attack, allegedly using British cluster bombs and other banned weapons. 
Civilian deaths in Yemen, estimated at over 10,000, and the humanitarian crisis pushed 
British public opinion against arms sale but the logic of  the British government remains 
constant: ‘if  we don’t sell arms to the Saudis, the French will’. 
Like Britain, following 9/11, France and Saudi became inter-connected through a series 
of  arm deals that boosted the French economy and offered Saudi Arabia a sense of  secu-
rity, especially after France continued to be a staunch critic of  Iran’s policy in the region, 
particularly in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Saudi military aid to Lebanon was conditional 
on purchasing equipment from France, a deal negotiated by then-President Francois 
Hollande. Saudi Arabia, however, cancelled this gift to put pressure on Iranian-backed 
Hezbollah, but pledged to compensate France for its losses. 
Saudi Arabia looked to France for support in its bid to oust Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad and strengthen the Syrian opposition to his regime. It also expected France not to 
normalise relations with Iran after the Nuclear Deal and to remain critical of  its regional 
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policy. France honoured the bargain in order to maintain its lucrative military trade with 
Saudi Arabia and neighbouring Gulf  countries. However, more recently, the policy to 
oust Bashar al-Assad failed to materialise and both Saudi Arabia and France – in fact most 
European interested parties – are currently facing serious defeat in Syria. As the objective 
was not to mediate in the Syrian crisis and reach peaceful coexistence between the regime 
and the many opposition groups, some of  which are violent radical Islamists and jihadists, 
a resolution in Syria was delayed until it became impossible to achieve. In a country where 
foreign policy has been the sole prerogative of  the president since the times of  General 
de Gaulle, newly elected President Emmanuel Macron may continue to seek closer ties 
with Saudi Arabia. But the Syrian debacle and the failure to resolve the crisis continue to 
haunt both countries. 
Added to that is the new Saudi–Qatari crisis which started in May 2017. Muhammad ibn 
Salman expects France and other European countries to accept the Saudi narrative about 
Qatar’s sponsorship of  terrorism, including its support for Hamas and the Muslim Broth-
erhood, both believed to destabilise the region, and the media policies of  the pan-Arab 
al-Jazeera channel. President Macron may be put under pressure to endorse the Saudis 
against Qatar, a move that would undermine France’s greater economic and military 
interests in this small but rich Gulf  state.14
With wide-ranging economic and military ties with Saudi Arabia, Germany was less than 
enthusiastic about the sudden rise of  the young Muhammad ibn Salman to power. In 
2015, a leaked German intelligence report was damning of  the prince,15 considering his 
rise cause for concern because of  his ‘regional destabilising impact’.16 While it is very 
unusual for the German intelligence services to disseminate such reports, the leak was 
perhaps a deliberate warning signal intended for the international community in general, 
and Germany’s European partners in particular. Both King Salman and his son did not 
attend the annual G20 Summit in Hamburg in July 2017, though this may have been due 
to their preoccupation with the escalating Qatar crisis. Perhaps Saudi Arabia did not want 
to face additional pressure from the G20 members to resolve the crisis and seek negotia-
tion, rather than the path – which they chose – of  confrontation with the small emirate. 
The King and his son avoided further questioning by sending a technocrat to the G20 
meeting. Another reason may be related to the abrupt sacking of  Muhammad ibn Nayef 
14  For an assessment of  a ‘Macron Doctrine’ in the Arab world, see Joseph Bahout, ‘The Difficult 
Definition of  a “Macron Doctrine” in the Near East and the Maghreb’ [La Difficile Définition d’une 
“Doctrine Macron” au Proche-Orient et au Maghreb], Orient, 10 July 2017. Available at http://orientxxi.
info/magazine/la-difficile-definition-d-une-doctrine-macron-au-proche-orient-et-au-maghreb,1942 
(accessed 19 July 2017).
15  Justin Huggler, ‘Saudi Arabia Destabilising Arab World, German Intelligence Warns’, The Telegraph, 
2 December 2015. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiara-
bia/12029546/Saudi-Arabia-destabilising-Arab-world-German-intelligence-warns.html (accessed 12 
June 2017).
16  Lizzie Dearden, ‘Saudi Arabia and Gulf  States Support Islamic Extremism in Germany: Intelligence 
Report Finds’, The Independent, 14 December 2016. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/europe/saudi-arabia-gulf-states-fund-islamic-extremism-germany-salafism-wahhabism-qa-
tar-kuwait-islamists-a7473551.html (accessed 13 June 2017).
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and his alleged house arrest, both of  which would signal a difficult and uncertain moment 
for the King, given that he must have alienated a large number of  aspiring princes, some 
of  whom are older and more experienced than his young son. 
Saudi Arabia, however, cherishes economic relations with Germany in addition to the 
training opportunities it offers Saudi youth.17 In 2016, Saudi Arabia invited Germany to 
be a guest of  honour at the annual National Guard al-Janadiriyah festival. However, even 
with over half  a billion euros worth of  weapons exported to Saudi Arabia, Germany was 
dismissed as a future military trading partner following their criticism of  the Saudi-led 
war in Yemen. Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed alarm at the high level of  civilian 
casualties and insisted that no military solution could resolve the conflict in Yemen. Saudi 
Arabia immediately responded by rejecting any future arms deals, which had long been 
lucrative but controversial in Germany.18
Notwithstanding the existing close ties between Saudi Arabia and the aforementioned 
European countries, the new Saudi crown prince does not seem to have time for Europe at 
the moment. For him it remains a source of  any weapons that he cannot get from the US 
and a network of  support for his regional policies, especially his rivalry with Iran and his 
interventionist agenda. This results in European arms manufacturers and governments 
competing for the attention of  the young prince, even if  it comes to undermining their 
own national interest by continuing to uncritically support Saudi Arabia. A more fruitful 
European policy would push Saudi Arabia towards greater dialogue with Iran and a modus 
vivendi with this formidable regional power, rather than simply and unequivocally taking 
the Saudi side lest lucrative arm deals get diverted elsewhere. 
Furthermore, the national interests of  Saudi Arabia’s European allies would be better 
served by encouraging the Saudis to seek mediation and conflict resolution in their 
regional battles, from Damascus to Sanaʿa. As with Iranian interventions in Syria, Iraq, 
Lebanon and Yemen, Saudi meddling in internal affairs of  Arab countries has had dev-
astating effects, prolonging conflicts, militarising the Arab uprisings, and precipitating 
sectarian conflicts, humanitarian disasters and an unprecedented influx of  refugees to 
European countries. Saudi Arabia’s role in spreading radical religious ideology is still a 
taboo topic in many European capitals where governments remain silent, preferring not 
to confront Riyadh with clear evidence of  its involvement in radicalising a troubled Euro-
pean Muslim population. 
Europe may have lost its favourite Saudi candidate, deposed Crown Prince Muhammad 
ibn Nayef, who had established a good rapport with Western intelligence services as he 
was seen as a key player in the fight against terrorism, with counter-terrorism dominating 
European policy agendas from London and Paris to Bonn and beyond. 
17  ‘Saudi–German Economic Relations’, Saudi Embassy in Berlin. Available at http://www.saudibotschaft.
de/en/information-for-german-business/ (accessed 29 August 2017).
18  Timothy Jones, ‘Saudi Arabia “Wants No More German Weapons”: Report’, DW News, 30 April 2017. 
Available at http://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-wants-no-more-german-weapons-report/a-38647662 
(accessed 29 August 2017).
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Losing the Regional Struggle: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and 
the Elephant in the Room
Muhammad ibn Salman is currently struggling to establish Saudi Arabia as a serious 
regional power on a par with Turkey, Iran and Israel. Each are currently flexing their 
muscles in a bid to emerge as the dominant force dictating the outcome of  several conflicts 
in the Arab world. In this heated regional struggle, new alliances are formed and old ones 
are reversed. 
The young Saudi prince has continued the anti-Iranian rhetoric that dates back to the 
reign of  King Abdullah (2005–2015). Unexpectedly, he recently announced that he is 
determined to bring the fight to the Iranian heartland, a statement tantamount to a dec-
laration of  war. Saudi prince and ex-director of  the Intelligence Services, Turki al-Faisal, 
attended two conferences held by the Iranian opposition abroad; notable amongst them 
were the Mujahideen-e Khalq, an opposition movement ostensibly combining Islam with 
Marxism.19 Under King Salman, the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran has con-
tinued without resolution in sight. The latest battleground is Yemen, where Saudi Arabia 
accuses the Iranians of  backing the Houthi rebellion. 
Saudi’s relations with Iran deteriorated after the American occupation of  Iraq in 2003. 
At the time the Saudis accused the US of  removing Saddam Hussein from power only to 
hand the country to the Iranians. The occupation led to the further expansion of  Iranian 
influence in the Arab world, a threat the Saudis had warned of. Today it is in Iraq where 
the King and his son are desperately trying to reach out to Iran, the backer of  both the 
Baghdad government and the various militias – most prominently the Popular Mobilisa-
tion Forces, or al-Hashd al-Shaabi, which it has armed and supported since 2014 to fight 
IS. Recently, for purely internal reasons, the Iraqi government of  Haider al-Abadi has 
proven more responsive to the Saudi advances than former Prime Minister Nouri al-Ma-
liki. Three Saudi state visits to Iraq promised to herald a new era of  Saudi–Iraqi relations. 
Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir visited Baghdad on 25 February 2017, followed by Prime 
Minister al-Abadi arriving in Riyadh in June to meet the King. A meeting with the Iraqi 
oil minister followed. 
However, Saudi Arabia went further by inviting the controversial Shiʿa cleric Muqtada 
al-Sadr to Riyadh. The Iraqi government welcomed Saudi advances to gain Arab sup-
port and undermine any accusations of  being motivated by Shiʿa sectarian politics. This 
was especially urgent after the liberation of  Mosul, where a Sunni population has since 
been struggling to find political space in Iraq in a post-IS era. In the battle of  Mosul, 
word of  atrocities committed by official and para-military Shiʿa Iraqi troops and militias 
spread across the Arab world. Al-Abadi has tried to recast himself  as a leader for all Iraqis 
rather than just the Shiʿa, and good relations with the Saudis could go some way towards 
improving his image. 
19  ‘Saudi Prince in Push for Iran Regime Change at Paris Opposition Conference’, Gulf  News, 9 July 
2016. Available at http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/iran/saudi-prince-in-push-for-iran-regime-
change-at-paris-opposition-conference-1.1859664 (accessed 20 July 2017).
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On the Saudi side, there is a belated understanding that their previous policy of  ostracis-
ing Iraq in the post-2003 era has merely intensified the country’s estrangement from its 
Arab neighbours, precipitating its steady drift toward the Iranian orbit. But without Iran’s 
approval, Saudi Arabia will find it difficult to ‘reconcile’ with Iraq, especially after several 
decades of  media wars, terrorism blamed on Saudi Arabia, sectarianisation (the politici-
sation of  sectarian identity)20 and general hostility. Iran’s militias operating on Iraqi soil 
and the pro-Iranian position of  its leading political party, namely Hizb al-Daʿwa, threaten 
any genuine future reconciliation between the two countries. Moreover, Riyadh’s erratic 
foreign policy under Muhammad ibn Salman is a further obstacle to any regional détente 
between the two estranged neighbours. It is unlikely that Saudi–Iraqi relations will return 
to any kind of  normality before the forthcoming Iraqi elections in 2018. Even if  Riyadh 
seeks genuine cooperation with Baghdad, Iran’s approval will remain crucial for further 
normalisation, let alone cooperation. 
Turkey, considered a close Saudi partner during the Syrian civil war, sided with Qatar in 
the latest Saudi–Qatari crisis of  May 2017 when the small Gulf  emirate was put under 
sanctions by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. Turkey is now in the process 
of  strengthening its military presence in Qatar, stationing several thousand soldiers there 
in preparation for any threat to the small emirate. In an unprecedented move, Saudi 
Arabia exacerbated the conflict with Qatar when it tried to promote a member of  Qatar’s 
Al-Thani royal family as an alternative emir, thus deepening an already near-intractable 
rift. This recent episode in inter-Gulf  relations has proven to seriously undermine coop-
eration and unity. More importantly, as with other regional conflicts in the Arab world, 
regional powers Turkey, Iran and Israel have taken the opportunity to become involved. 
Israel backed Saudi Arabia and its allies when it announced that it would close al-Jazeera’s 
Jerusalem bureau in July 2017. 
Muhammad ibn Salman may have scored success with the elephant in the room, Israel 
– now jokingly dubbed the newest Sunni state – in his bid to form a pan-Islamic and 
international alliance against both Iran and Qatar. He has continued to clandestinely 
cooperate with Israel on security and economic matters.21 In July 2016, a Saudi delegation 
of  academics and businessmen visited Israel with a view to establishing discreet relations, 
the purpose of  which was to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities and enlist 
Israel in any armed confrontation with Iran. Saudi Arabia also has a new geographical 
and strategic link to Israel after Egypt offered to cede the two Red Sea islands of  Sanafir 
and Tiran to Saudi Arabia. Both islands sit on the Straits of  Tiran, Israel’s only access to 
the Red Sea, and they may in the future serve as launching pads from which to enhance 
military and security cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi public is 
being prepared for greater cooperation with Israel, especially through Saudi-sponsored 
20  For an in-depth discussion of  the concept as it relates to the Middle East, see Nader Hashemi and 
Danny Postel (eds), Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of  the Middle East (London: Hurst Publishers, 
2017).
21  Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Israel and the Arab Gulf  States: Drivers and Directions of  Change’, Baker 
Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, September 2016. Available at https://www.bakerinstitute.org/
media/files/research_document/13eaaa71/CME-pub-GCCIsrael-090716.pdf  (accessed 20 July 2017). 
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media, now much more willing to permit articles that do not overtly criticise the Israeli 
occupation and its treatment of  Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Saudi Arabia 
has also criticised Qatar for supporting the Palestinian group Hamas, now designated 
as a terrorist organisation. Muhammad ibn Salman has certainly pleased the Israelis by 
doing so and assured them of  his willingness to foster greater cooperation. However we 
shouldn’t expect the Israeli flag to be raised in Riyadh soon. This will take some prepara-
tion and coordination and the stakes in such a controversial move are high for the young 
aspiring prince. 
Conclusion
Salman’s kingdom is being shaped amid real domestic, regional, and international chal-
lenges. The newly appointed Crown Prince Muhammad ibn Salman is not a capable 
firefighter or a tactical statesman. He is confident that, equipped with only money and 
unconditional US support, he can surmount any obstacles to him becoming king as soon 
as possible. So far, he has succeeded in marginalising his rival cousin Muhammad ibn 
Nayef  and enlisting Donald Trump as an ally, albeit momentarily. He is unlikely to turn 
his attention to Europe as he considers the US the only superpower that can guarantee his 
survival, despite the recent broadening of  the search for international partners. 
However, even Muhammad ibn Salman’s command of  a rich economy – despite falling oil 
prices – and recent loud US support have not enabled him to claim victories in the many 
wars and conflicts he has embarked upon. The most obvious setback is in Yemen where 
over two years of  Saudi airstrikes have failed to end the local power struggle between mul-
tiple factions. His relations with Qatar are bound to deteriorate as the conflict has already 
reached a stalemate. By July 2017, the Saudis had already tempered their list of  demands 
imposed on Qatar a month earlier as pre-conditions for lifting the boycott and sanctions. 
His rivalry with Iran is currently fought through several proxy wars. As long as he contin-
ues to secure Mr Trump’s approval and support, Muhammad ibn Salman is more likely 
to light further regional fires than extinguish existing ones. 
King Salman and his son have decisively shifted Saudi foreign policy from cautious diplo-
macy and behind-the-scenes manoeuvring to a more interventionist doctrine. Under the 
future kingship of  the young prince, Saudi Arabia will continue to attempt to become 
an undisputed Arab regional power even if  this requires greater shifting alliances, for 
example closer cooperation and partnership with Israel. The domestic consequences of 
such a provocative policy may backfire and lead to future internal upheaval. Saudi Arabia 
has been set on an unknown future path and its aggressive foreign policy is above all a 
reflection of  domestic political and economic uncertainty that has prevailed since Salman 
became king. 
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